Newsweek
The U.S. Should Stay Out of Asia’s Island Disputes
The Asian order is under strain as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become an economic colossus with growing military might and diplomatic influence. The PRC is asserting territorial claims once considered impractical or worthless. Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam all stand opposed to these claims.
Washington is not a claimant but has sparred with the PRC over the U.S. Navy’s legal right to engage in intelligence gathering in Chinese waters. More important, America has a formal military alliance with Japan, which, the president declared, covers disputed territories. Washington’s military relationship with Manila is looser, but Philippine officials are seeking a similar territorial guarantee.
The Obama administration has escalated U.S. involvement by sending American aircraft over islands reclaimed by China and discussing joint patrols with the Japanese.
Most of the islands are intrinsically worthless and provide little security value. Maritime rights are affected, but, in peacetime, the difference wouldn’t matter so much. In wartime, everything would depend on the capabilities of the contending navies.
The economic benefits from control are real but still relatively small compared to the economies of most of the claimants. For most of the countries, national ego is the primary issue.
What should the United States do? American interests are few and of middling importance. Washington primarily seeks to uphold global norms, in this case, navigational freedom and peaceful conflict resolution.
It is widely assumed that America’s involvement would deter China from starting a war. However, any attempts to coerce the PRC over its perceived interests would add conflict to the U.S.-China relationship.
As I point out on National Interest online: “China likely would respond by matching American air and naval maneuvers, accelerating military outlays, and challenging U.S. interests elsewhere. Americans should reflect on how they would respond if Beijing acted like the U.S.”
Maintaining the overly large and expensive military presence necessary for Washington to project power sustainable over the long term. It costs far more to build carriers than to sink them. Americans are unlikely to heed a clarion call for sacrifice to ensure that the Senkakus stay Japanese.
Instead of goading China, the administration should withdraw from East Asia’s territorial miasma. First, Washington should acknowledge that East Asian hegemony it not essential for America’s security.
Second, Washington should make clear through action, as well as rhetoric, that it takes no position regarding competing territorial claims. While the United States should assert freedom of navigation—and insist that there is no valid legal justification for turning 80 percent of the South China Sea into Chinese territorial waters—Beijing has not threatened that basic freedom.
Third, the administration should remove contested territories from security guarantees. America’s interest is in Japan’s and the Philippines’ independence, not their control over worthless rock piles. It is especially foolish to threaten a nuclear-armed state over territories to which the latter might be entitled.
Fourth, the administration should allow events to take their natural course. China’s neighbors are growing increasingly hostile to Beijing’s aggressiveness. Japan is spending more and rethinking historic strictures on its military, smaller nations are arming—some of which are working with Tokyo—and everyone is encouraging India to play a larger regional role.
Fifth, U.S. officials should more effectively make the case for negotiation. Washington should press its friends to offer creative solutions to the region’s many disputes, such as setting aside or sharing island sovereignty.
Finally, Washington should highlight the advantages of peace for all concerned, especially China. The future should not be risked for stakes of such limited value.
What should the United States do about East Asia’s territorial disputes? In most of East Asia’s territorial controversies, America’s interests are peripheral and Washington should play a minor role. America’s most important interest today is keeping the peace.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. This article first appeared on the Cato Institute website.
电脑直译:
亚洲的顺序是根据菌株作为中国人民共和国(中国)已经成为一个经济巨人不断增长的军事实力和外交影响力。中国声称是曾经被认为是不切实际的或毫无价值的领土要求。文莱,日本,马来西亚,菲律宾和越南都站在反对这些说法。
华盛顿是不是一个索赔,但一直对打中国在美国海军从事情报搜集在中国水域的合法权利。更重要的是,美国已经与日本,其中,总统宣布正式军事联盟,涵盖了有争议的领土。华盛顿与马尼拉的军事关系是松散的,但菲律宾官员正在寻求类似的领土保证。
奥巴马政府已升级美国参与由美国派遣飞机在岛屿由中国再生和讨论与日本联合巡逻。
大部分岛屿都是本质毫无价值,并提供小安的价值。海洋权益受到影响,但在平时,差别就那么重要了。在战时,一切都将取决于海军竞争的能力。
从控制的经济利益是真实的,但还是比较少相比,大多数索赔人的经济。对于大多数国家,民族自我是首要问题。
什么美国应该怎么办?美国的利益是一些中等重要性。华盛顿主要目的是维护全球规范,在这种情况下,航行自由,和平解决冲突。
人们普遍认为,美国的参与将阻止从中国发动一场战争。但是,任何企图迫使中国在其感知的利益会增加冲突对美国与中国的关系。
正如我指出的国家利益在线上:“中国可能会通过匹配美国的空军和海军演习,加速军费,和其他地方挑战美国的利益作出回应。美国人应该反思他们会如何反应,如果北京采取行动,如美国“
保持必要过于庞大而昂贵的军事存在对华盛顿投射力量的可持续的长期。它的成本远远打造运营商,而不是沉它们。美国人是不太可能听从登高一呼牺牲,保证了尖阁列岛日本停留。
相反,中国唆使的,政府应该退出东亚的领土瘴气。首先,华盛顿应该承认,东亚霸权美国的安全就不是必需的。
第二,华盛顿应该明确通过行动,以及修辞,它需要有关竞争的领土要求没有立场。而美国主张应该自由航行,并坚持认为没有有效的法律依据转向80%的中国南海成为中国领海,北京还没有威胁说,基本的自由。
第三,政府应该从安全保障,消除争议性的领土。美国的利益是日本和菲律宾的独立性,而不是他们的控制毫无价值石堆。这是特别愚蠢的威胁一个拥有核武器的国家在领土其中后者可能有资格。
第四,政府应该允许事件采取他们的自然病程。中国的邻国正在变得越来越敌视北京的侵略性。日本花越来越反思历史上狭窄的军事,小国正在武装,其中一些正在与东京,每个人都鼓励印度发挥更大的区域作用。
第五,美国官员应该更有效地使谈判的情况。华盛顿应该按它的朋友,提供创造性的解决方案,该地区的许多纠纷,如撤销或共享岛屿的主权。
最后,华盛顿应该强调和平的优势,为有关各方,特别是中国。未来不应该冒着对于这种有限的值赌注。
什么美国应该做一下东亚的领土纠纷?在大多数东亚的领土争议,美国的利益是外围和华盛顿应该扮演一个次要角色。美国今天最重要的利益维持和平。
道格班铎是卡托研究所高级研究员。这篇文章最早出现在美国卡托研究所的网站上。
(美国圆桌会议提供)